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Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Payo, 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 79 (Oct. 26, 2017)1 
 
TORTS: IMPLIED ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK AND  
DISCRETIONARY-FUNCTION IMMUNITY 
 
Summary 
 
Implied assumption of the risk does not apply when a student is required to participate in 
a physical education class because the doctrine’s “voluntariness” element is not satisfied. 
Discretionary-function immunity does not apply when cases allege inadequate supervision or 
instruction because such decisions, while discretionary, are not policy-based, as the discretionary-
immunity test requires. Decisions are not entitled to discretionary-function immunity unless they 
entail governmental planning or policy formulation, which involves economic, social, and political 
considerations. 
 
Background 
 
Makani Kai Payo attended a middle school located within appellant Clark County School 
District (CCSD). In 2004, Payo sustained an eye injury while participating in a floor hockey game 
during his mandatory physical education class. The jury’s negligence verdict awarded Payo past 
and future medical damages. 
 
Discussion  
 
 The Court considers an appeal of a final judgment in a tort action. The Nevada Supreme 
Court reviewed de novo whether the doctrines of implied assumption of risk, and discretionary-
function immunity barred a negligence claim, and whether the evidence supported the jury’s 
finding of proximate cause.  
 
Implied assumption of the risk doctrine 
 
Implied assumption of the risk requires “(1) voluntary exposure to danger, and (2) actual 
knowledge of the risk assumed.”2 Payo’s participation in the floor hockey game was not “purely 
voluntary” because NRS 389.018(3)(d) mandates physical education in public schools. 3 Payo was 
participating in the floor hockey game as part of the required physical education class when the 
injury occurred. Accordingly, the required “voluntariness” element was not satisfied, and the 
implied assumption of the risk doctrine was inapplicable. Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
doctrine of implied assumption of the risk did not bar the negligence claim. 
 
Discretionary-function-immunity doctrine 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court had not addressed whether discretionary-function immunity 
applied to P.E. teachers when an injured student alleged negligent supervision and instruction 
                                                     
1  By Alma Orozco. 
2  Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Anderson, 77 Nev. 68, 71, 358 P.2d 892, 894 (1961). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 389.018(3)(d).  
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during P.E. class. Under NRS 41.032, discretionary-function immunity applies, and a government 
defendant is not liable for negligent decisions, if the decision (1) involves an “element of individual 
judgment or choice,” and (2) is based on social, economic, or political policy considerations.4 To 
determine whether discretionary-function immunity applies to the government defendant, the 
Court (1) considers the facts of the case; (2) recognizes that Nevada’s sovereign immunity waiver 
applies broadly and exceptions are strictly construed; and (3) considers the purpose of the 
exceptions, which is to “prevent judicial ‘second guessing’ of legislative and administrative 
decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy.” 
In its analysis, the Court considered other courts’ decisions.5 The Court agreed with 
decisions determining that discretionary-function does not apply where inadequate supervision or 
instruction is alleged because such decisions, although discretionary, are not policy based. Hence, 
such decisions do not meet the second part of the discretionary immunity test.6 Decisions are not 
entitled to discretionary-function immunity unless they entail governmental planning or policy 
formulation, which involves economic, social, and political considerations.  
Discretionary-function immunity does not apply to all CCSD’s discretionary decisions. 
The decisions to (1) allow more players on the floor than the rules indicated; (2) play with a 
different type of ball than the type detailed in the rules; and (3) to supervise the P.E. class the way 
it did, although discretionary, were not based on policy considerations to which immunity would 
apply. These decisions did not involve any economic, social, and political considerations. 
Accordingly, discretionary-function immunity does not bar Payo’s claims regarding CCSD’s use 
of a different type of ball, and allowing more players on the floor, as detailed in the rules. 
Discretionary-function immunity applies to Payo’s other claims. CCSD’s decisions to add 
floor hockey to the P.E. class curriculum, and to not provide students with safety equipment were 
discretionary, and policy based decisions. CCSD decided to add floor hockey to the curriculum 
and decided not to provide students with safety equipment because of budgetary considerations. 
As such, the decisions satisfy the discretionary-function immunity two-prong test. Therefore, 
discretionary-function immunity bars Payo’s claim regarding CCSD’s negligence in adding floor 
hockey to the P.E. curriculum, and the decision to exclude safety equipment because they were 
policy based decisions.  
 
Proximate cause 
 
Next, the Court considered the sufficiency of evidence to support the jury’s finding that 
any conduct on behalf of CCSD was the proximate cause of Payo’s injuries because not all Payo’s 
claims were barred. The court must assume that the jury “believed all the evidence favorable to 
Payo and drew all reasonable inferences in his favor” to determine whether the jury’s finding that 
CCSD was negligent was supported by substantial evidence. The Court will only overturn the 
jury’s verdict if there is no substantial evidence, which a reasonable mind might deem adequate to 
support a conclusion. The court will not uphold a verdict where the plaintiff cannot recover as a 
matter of law. 
                                                     
4  Martinez v. Maruszczak, 123 Nev. 433, 446, 168 P.3d 720, 729 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.032 (2017).  
5  See Mosely v. Dayton City Sch. Dist., Case No. 11336, 1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 2695 (Ct. App. July 6, 1989); 
Sutphen v. Benthian, 165 N.J. Super. 79, 397 A.2d 709 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Gonzalez v. Univ. Sys. of N.H., 
No. 451217, 2005 Conn. Super. LEXIS 288 (Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2005).  
6  Id. at 11; Sutphen v. Benthian, 165 N.J. Super. 79, 397 A.2d 709 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979). 
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A negligence claim requires, the plaintiff to prove: (1) a duty of care exists, (2) breach of 
that duty, (3) legal causation, and (4) damages. Legal causation requires a showing of actual cause 
and proximate cause. Proximate cause is any cause producing the injury, which in natural 
foreseeable and continuous sequence is unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, without 
which the result would not have occurred. 
Payo’s negligence claim against CCSD’s was based on CCSD’s use of a different type of 
ball, allowing additional players on the floor, and the P.E. teacher’s lack of game instruction. Payo 
failed to provide evidence that the type of ball used caused his injuries, and failed to offer evidence 
indicating how the large teams contributed to his injuries. Further, Payo failed to offer evidence or 
expert testimony showing that the lack of safety equipment caused his injuries. Payo testified he 
didn’t know of anything that the teacher did to cause or contribute to his injuries. Payo also could 
not say “whether additional or different measures could have prevented his injury.” Accordingly, 
the Court concluded that the jury could not have found CCSD’s conduct was the proximate cause 
of Payo’s eye injury, or “reached its negligence verdict on any fair interpretation of the evidence.” 
Therefore, the verdict was overturned.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The respondent’s claims failed and the Court reversed the judgment against CCSD. The 
Court held the legal doctrine of implied assumption of risk did not apply in this case, and the 
discretionary-function immunity doctrine did not bar a negligence claim alleging inadequate 
instruction and supervision because such discretionary decisions were not policy based. Further, 
Payo failed to provide sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding of proximate cause.  
 
 
